Pope Francis, the ecumenical challenge in the Holy Year

If all the rumors are confirmed, Pope Francis will visit Nicaea on May 24, together with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew, to celebrate the 1,700th anniversary of the Council of Nicaea.

It will not be the first joint trip of Bartholomew and Francis, who have already been together to Jerusalem and Lesbos. If and when it happens, the visit will unfold within a complex context in which several threads of the pontificate and the current geopolitical situation will be bound up with one another, all of them crucial.

The first is this: Pope Francis, who is going to Türkyie and will likely also pass through Ankara, where he will meet with Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan made a historic visit to Pope Francis in 2018 has been in constant contact with the Pope, intervening in the Gaza issue – and Erdogan’s wife has also organized a humanitarian conference to defend the Palestinian people – and Turkey is increasing its influence in the Middle East just as Russia, after the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, is losing it.

However, the meeting with Erdogan will concern not only geopolitical issues but also ecumenical ones. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s most important strategic ally, and Azerbaijan has been accused of “cultural genocide” by the Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh – “genocide” that allegedly took place during the last century but which is now said to be reinvigorated since Azerbaijan regained control of ancient Artsakh after a painful peace.

Relations between the Holy See and the Armenian Apostolic Church are excellent, and Etchmiadzin has even established a liaison office in Rome. However, this meeting with Erdogan could impact ecumenical relations in addition to diplomatic issues. This is not something to be underestimated.

The second concerns the special relationship between the Holy See and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

This relationship is also important considering the situation in Ukraine. Bartholomew supported the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s request for a so-called tomos (document) of autocephaly. In this way, it was possible to establish an Orthodox Church with a center in Kyiv, separate from the Patriarchate of Moscow, which claims Ukraine as its canonical territory.

Bartholomew’s decision led to the so-called “Orthodox schism” in 2018, with the Moscow Patriarchate abandoning the ecumenical relations tables co-chaired by Constantinople, such as the Joint Catholic-Orthodox Theological Commission, while continuing bilateral relations with Rome.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, the Patriarchate of Moscow threw its support behind the “special operation” as Russian president Vladimir Putin called it. Patriarch Kirill even called it a “holy war.”

Moscow, jealous of its canonical territory, did not hesitate to do the same “snub” to the Patriarchate of Alexandria by establishing two exarchates in Africa for Orthodox believers who did not recognize Constantinople’s decisions on Ukraine.

These exarchates of the Moscow Patriarchate in Africa, however, also follow the interests of Russia, which has sought to extend its influence to African countries as well.

Today, the dialogue between Moscow and Rome appears to be under the radar. At the beginning of December, Metropolitan Antony, the head of the Department of External Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, was in Rome and met with Pope Francis and Cardinal Pietro Parolin, but no official notice of these meetings was given, even on the Patriarchate’s websites.

However, it is known that Pope Francis cherishes the dream of going to Moscow, and in the crucial phases of the war, he seems more sensitive to Russian issues than Ukrainian ones. There was a verbal imbalance, which obviously did not escape Bartholomew.

Therefore, the meeting with Bartholomew could also allow the Ecumenical Patriarch to present to Pope Francis his considerations regarding ongoing conflict. That conversation could give Francissome tools and perhaps bring him either to change course or to continue on the path.

The third theme concerns the Petrine primacy.

A document, “The Bishop of Rome,” highlighted the possibility of exploring new forms of the Petrine ministry, as already hoped for by John Paul II in Ut Unum Sint. It looked precisely at the question of synodality and how this has developed with the synodal process desired by Pope Francis. And there is a final document of the Synod on synodality that no longer speaks of a “universal Church,” even if this topic will create debate.

How, then, could the meeting with Bartholomew also lead to declarations on exercising the Petrine primacy? It is an interesting topic, mainly since Bartholomew acted as the “first” in the synaxis of the Orthodox Churches by granting autocephaly to Ukraine, for example.

How will the trip be managed, what will the communications of the trip be, and what will the act of commemoration of Nicaea be managed?

These are the crucial questions for anyone who would understand the direction of ecumenical dialogue between Rome and Constantinople.

Finally, the trip to Nicaea also represents a model for relations with other sister Churches and a testing ground for ecumenical dialogue in view of the 2026 European Ecumenical Assembly in Vilnius. On that occasion, the new Charta Oecumenica will be signed. From that text, many things will be understood.

There is a debate on the approach of the new document: the Protestant communities aim for a concrete, pragmatic approach, which also includes a commitment to significant issues such as sustainable development; on the Catholic side, there is the idea that the meeting takes place first of all in the common faith and theological research, while the practical factor is a consequence.

The drafting of the Charter will tell whether we are going in the Protestant direction or not.

When the Pope goes to Nicaea, much more will be known about the text, which should be in the final stages. Therefore, much will also be understood about the general direction of the Church.

In the Jubilee Year, these are crucial issues.

It is noteworthy that Pope Francis did not open the Holy Door of St. Paul Outside the Walls, which is the Roman “ecumenical” basilica par excellence. There was not the tremendous ecumenical moment with the sister Churches that characterized the opening of the Holy Door of that great Roman church at the time of John Paul II.

Is this a sign that Pope Francis is aiming for a practical ecumenism rather than an ecumenism of theology, dialogue, and symbols?