Pope Francis, will his diplomacy stand the test of time?

In his Urbi et Orbi address on Christmas Day, Pope Francis renewed his appeals for ceasefires in Ukraine and the Holy Land. He also took a look at other significant global crises and specifically mentioned the decades-long division—physical and political, hence social—in Cyprus.

Never before has Pope Francis’ diplomacy been put to the test like in this Jubilee Year.

His position on world affairs follows people’s stories and is made up of extemporaneous information. The Pope receives reports from the Secretariat of State, maintains a direct line with the nuncios (his ambassadors) whom he receives periodically, and has a general vision of things.

Pope Francis has several limitations, however, when a real diplomatic effort is needed. First, his modes of communication have limitations: Francis makes spontaneity and direct communication his hallmark, but this cannot work when every word must be weighed. Every word the Pope says—whoever he is—has consequences and elicits some sort of reaction, simply because the Pope says it, and this is a limiting factor (or ought to be). Finally, there are limits to the Pope’s and the Holy See’s readings of given situations and to the role the Holy See can play on the diplomatic field.

Pope Francis’s diplomacy is at a critical juncture because, in a word, Pope Francis does not speak diplomatically or do diplomacy in the usual sense of the term.

Pope Francis had great diplomatic success during his eleven-year pontificate and was instrumental in restoring U.S.-Cuba relations in 2014. Pope Francis has emerged at times as a great moral leader, at different times as a religious leader with an understanding of the realities on the ground, and at other times as a global leader capable of meeting the challenges at the heart of the world, such as climate change.

However, Pope Francis’ efforts have led to little in the way of papal mediation. Attempts to mediate in Venezuela have failed despite the Pope having sent two special envoys. The Church in Nicaragua is experiencing very strong persecution, which repeated calls for dialogue have not brought to an end. The Church’s participation in Nicaraguan national dialogue is in fact much attenuated even by comparison with its already marginal participation at the outset of the crisis in the country.

As for Ukraine, Pope Francis has had a wavering course.

On the one hand, he has appeared more sympathetic to Russia’s position than one may expect any global Catholic leader to be toward any aggressor in any war. That’s most emphatically not to say Pope Francis has ever approved of Russian aggression. Indeed Pope Francis’s first thought was to go to the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Holy See to ask for an end to the attacks. There was no Ukrainian ambassador to the Holy See at the time, but even when a Ukrainian Ambassador came, the Pope did not make a similar visit to that embassy. This created an inequality of treatment. Pope Francis made multiple appeals for peace in Ukraine, met with the Synod of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, called an inter-departmental meeting, and even received the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – a signal not to be underestimated because it put the local Orthodox Church on an equal footing with other Orthodox Churches, opposing Moscow.

It all seems extemporaneous and rather confused—nearly impossible to say when or where the personal initiatives of the Holy Father end and the institutional diplomatic efforts of the Holy See begin, or even whether there is or ought to be a meaningful distinction of them at all—not part of a long-term strategy but rather the more-or-less immediate result of what the Pope has heard and what he thinks on any given day.

Even in the situation of the Holy Land, Pope Francis did not go beyond appeals for peace. His diplomats sought a line that could defend Israel’s existence and condemn terrorist acts while condemning any excessive reaction that was detrimental to the population. While all this was happening, Pope Francis continued with appeals for peace, maintaining a direct line with the parish in Gaza, where there is an Argentine priest.

But how much does a direct line to the parish allow us to look at the general situation, context, and nuances?

Pope Francis reported that Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, had been unable to enter Gaza. The government of Israel immediately responded. In reality, Israel said, all the authorizations had been given. Pizzaballa was then regularly there for Christmas. Perhaps the Pope had been told that the Patriarch was expected and had not yet arrived due to some problems, and the Pope immediately thought of reporting it.

Now and then, Pope Francis’s words include significant issues that are ignored by the international world. In the Christmas urbi et orbi, reference was made to the situation in Cyprus, the northern part of which has been occupied for fifty years.

Cyprus is part of the Holy Land. The war Hamas began on October 7th of last year has made has made the island something of a haven for refugees. The Turkish-occupied northern part of Cyprus risks becoming the Turkish outpost in an increasingly complex situation. What will the Pope do? Will he lean towards Turkey as he leaned towards Russia, with the idea of flattering the emerging power? Or will he side with Cyprus and against its occupation in the face of what is the last wall in Europe?

In short, Pope Francis’s diplomacy lacks verbal prudence, context when making declarations, and sometimes international vision. The Church of the Peripheries fails to be a Church of Peace because peace seen from the peripheries differs from the peace that can be pursued.

As we approach Pope Francis’s speech to the diplomatic corps on January 9th, we must reflect on the themes. The speech will be balanced, as these speeches always are, but the Pope’s action will be decisive. And as these years have taught us, the Pope’s action is unpredictable.

Ultimately, as said, Pope Francis’s only strictly diplomatic success was restoring relations between the United States and Cuba. However, the Church there acted as a guarantor for two states that had already lifted the embargo. The Church had been a privileged channel of communication between the US and Cuba for years. Pope Francis inherited years of work.

Pope Francis mainly had results in the media when it came to taking the initiative. Beloved for his positions on climate change and migrants, as well as on human trafficking, Pope Francis tried to address the world’s problems as he always does i.e., with personal decisions and special envoys (Zuppi in Russia and Ukraine, in the past Celli and then Tscherrig in Venezuela) but without a long-term strategy.

When it comes to the significant issues that concern the secular world today, people and leaders of peoples listen to the Holy See. When Pope Francis speaks about abortion, attacks gender ideology, or defends the family, he may as well be talking to a wall. The Holy See is less listened-to when it commits itself to peace.

The risk is that the Holy See will be used only as a humanitarian agency.

This is also a major theme, and it will be even more fundamental in this Jubilee and in what Pope Francis calls “the piecemeal world war.” The theme of the Holy See’s sovereignty is questioned even within the Holy See itself and weakened—objectively speaking—by structural decisions regarding the government that tend to blur the line between the Holy See and the Vatican City State, —such as the Vatican City trials with questionable judicial procedures.

If the Holy See does not have a strong sovereignty, why would it be worthy of being listened to in the assembly of nations?

After eleven years of pontificate, the diplomatic challenges of the Francis pontificate are really only just beginning.